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COMMENT 
MANNING, POWELL, AND THE HABITUAL 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF ADDICTION 
MATT DEAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Bryan Manning, a homeless resident of Roanoke, Virginia, 
has been arrested and prosecuted more than thirty times for 
drinking or possessing alcohol.1  Although alcohol is generally le-
gal in Virginia,2 Mr. Manning was forbidden for many years to 
“possess” it, “consume” it, or “purchase” it.3  On at least one occa-
sion, police arrested him merely for “smelling like alcohol.”4  On 
another occasion, he was arrested because he happened to be 
shopping in a Walmart where alcoholic beverages were sold.5  For 
decades, Virginia law permitted a state circuit court to issue a 
civil order declaring an individual to be “an habitual drunkard” 
and “prohibiting,” or interdicting, “the sale of alcoholic bever-
ages” to that individual “until further ordered.”6  At a civil hear-
† Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2021, St. John’s Uni-
versity School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Sheldon A. Evans for his guidance 
in writing this Comment, to the editorial board and staff of the Law Review for their 
hard work and friendship, and to my family and my chosen family for their love and 
support. Also, a special thanks to my husband and biggest cheerleader, Brian J. 
Keller, who encourages me in everything I do. 
1 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 51, 54, Hendrick v. 
Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 (W.D. Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Manning v. Caldwell, 
900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 16-CV-
0095) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
2 Nine Virginia counties forbid the sale of “liquor by the drink” and are thus clas-
sified as “dry,” but sales of beer and wine are permitted everywhere. VA. ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGE CONTROL AUTH., A COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2018, at 41 n.1 (2018), https://www.abc.virginia.gov/ 
library/about/pdfs/2018-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KYV-JMH5]. Even within 
“dry” counties, “certain towns” and “election districts” may choose by referendum to 
permit the sale of liquor by the drink. Id. 
3 See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 50. 
4 Id. ¶ 52. 
5 Id. 
6 See Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 866, § 1, 1993 Va. Acts 1257, 1293 (current 
version at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333); Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 
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ing on October 5, 2010, the Circuit Court for the City of Roanoke 
entered just such an interdiction order against Mr. Manning.7  
“[N]either Mr. Manning nor counsel on [his] behalf” attended 
that proceeding.8 
An individual subject to an interdiction order could face as 
much as a year in jail merely for possessing or attempting to 
possess alcohol, or for public intoxication.9  The statute neither 
defined the term “habitual drunkard” nor provided guidance for 
courts in determining how or when to apply it.10  In Manning v. 
Caldwell (Manning II), the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, invalidated Virginia’s inter-
diction scheme on two grounds.11  First, the court held that the 
statutory scheme was unconstitutionally vague because it failed 
to establish “any standard of conduct by which persons [could] 
determine whether they [we]re violating the statute.”12  Second, 
relying in part on the United States Supreme Court’s plurality 
opinion in Powell v. Texas,13 the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
Virginia’s interdiction scheme violated the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment because it penal-
ized homeless alcoholics “for conduct that [was] both compelled 
by their illness and [was] otherwise lawful for all those of legal 
drinking age.”14  According to the dissent, however, the majority’s 
opinion introduces a “nebulous ‘nonvolitional conduct’ defense,” 
which promises to “metastasize and absolve individuals from 
 
264, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In 2020, the Virginia General Assembly amended 
the interdiction statute to preclude the interdiction of “habitual drunkard[s].” Act of 
Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 150, § 1, 2020 Va. Acts (Va. Advance Legis. Serv. Mar. 2020) 
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333).  
Only one other state, Utah, implements an interdiction scheme similar to 
Virginia’s. See Brief of National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 17, Manning II, 930 F.3d 264 (No. 17-
1320). 
7 See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 49. 
8 Id. 
9 See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-322 (2016) (providing that an interdicted individual 
who “possess[es] any alcoholic beverages” or is “drunk in public” is “guilty of a Class 
1 misdemeanor”); id. § 18.2-11 (2014) (providing that the “authorized punishment[ ] 
for conviction of a [Class 1] misdemeanor” is “confinement in jail for not more than 
twelve months”); Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269. 
10 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 268. 
11 Id. at 285–86. 
12 Id. at 274. 
13 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
14 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 281 (emphasis omitted). 
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personal responsibility for all forms and manners of criminal 
acts.”15 
Legal scholar Glanville Williams once wrote that “cases in 
which the moral indignation of the judge is aroused frequently 
make bad law,”16 and Manning II may be just such a case.  A ma-
jority of the en banc court concluded that the burden of interdic-
tion was too great for Mr. Manning and other homeless alcoholics 
to bear.  But in lifting that burden, the en banc court erred in 
relying on the Supreme Court’s fragmented decision in Powell. 
Within weeks of the decision in Manning II, litigants in the 
Fourth Circuit and elsewhere began to cite it either as precedent 
or as a candidate for reversal.17  For example, the plaintiffs in a 
case before the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland cited Manning II to support an argument that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act’s Public Charge Rule “is subject 
to void-for-vagueness review.”18  And the correct interpretation of 
Powell recently became an issue in City of Boise v. Martin.19  
Noting that the various interpretations of Powell among the 
Courts of Appeals have created a “three-way split,” the petitioner 
in Martin asked the Supreme Court to review “the fractured 
opinion in Powell,” which has “left unsettled an important ques-
tion of . . . law.”20  Whether and to what extent Powell remains 
good law has been an open question for some time.21  The Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Manning II has only served to renew the 
urgency of that question. 
 
15 Id. at 304 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
16 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 105 
(1957). 
17 Moreover, as is to be expected, Courts in the Fourth Circuit have begun 
treating Manning II as binding precedent. See, e.g., Hill v. Coggins, 423 F. Supp. 3d 
209, 218 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (“[L]aws that nominally impose only civil consequences 
warrant a ‘relatively strict test’ for vagueness if the law is ‘quasi-criminal’ and has a 
stigmatizing effect.” (quoting Manning II, 930 F.3d at 273)). 
18 Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum 
at 28–30, CASA de Maryland v. Trump, No. 19-CV-2715, (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2019). 
19 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6, City of Boise v. Martin, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019) 
(No. 19-247). 
20 Id. The Court denied the petition for certiorari and let stand the three-way 
circuit split. See Martin, 140 S. Ct. 674 (mem.). 
21 See Maria Slater, Note, Is Powell Still Valid? The Supreme Court’s Changing 
Stance on Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 104 VA. L. REV. 547, 564–72 (2018). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Virginia’s Interdiction Scheme 
As originally enacted in 1873, Virginia’s interdiction statute 
“had a rehabilitative purpose.”22  If at least two of a person’s “rel-
atives or friends” believed him to be “an habitual drunkard and 
lost to self-control,” they could swear a “complaint on oath in 
writing,” initiating a process by which the alleged “drunkard” 
could be committed “to the care and protection” of the Virginia 
Inebriates’ Home.23  The statute limited the term of confinement 
to twelve months.24  It also provided that anyone who felt “ag-
grieved” by being deemed “an habitual drunkard” could demand 
a jury trial “as a matter of right.”25  If the jury found that the ac-
cused was not in fact “an habitual drunkard and lost to self-
control,” the court was required to “dismiss[ ] the whole pro-
ceeding[ ]” and enter “a judgment against the parties making 
complaint, for costs.”26 
In 1934, Virginia enacted the interdiction scheme that re-
mained in force until Manning II invalidated it in 2019.27  Section 
4.1-333(A) of the Code of Virginia allowed a state circuit court to 
“enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of alcoholic bev-
erages” to “any person” who “ha[d] been convicted of driving . . . 
while intoxicated or ha[d] shown himself to be an habitual 
drunkard.”28  Although the statute required “a hearing upon due 
notice,”29 it neither defined “habitual drunkard” nor provided 
“any elements or standards” to guide a court in determining that 
an individual “qualifie[d] as an ‘habitual drunkard.’ ”30  Nor did 
the statute set forth any procedure by which an interdicted 
individual could challenge or rescind the “habitual drunkard” 
label.  The circuit court had authority to “alter, amend or cancel” 
its interdiction orders “as it deem[ed] proper,”31 but if it declined 
 
22 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 270 n.3 (citing Va. Code ch. 83, § 5 (1873)). 




27 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 270 n.3. 
28 Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 866, § 1, 1993 Va. Acts 1257, 1293 (current version at 
VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A)). 
29 Id. 
30 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 268 (“Instead, [the statute] relegate[d] those matters 
‘to the satisfaction of the circuit court.’ ”). 
31 Ch. 866, § 1, 1993 Va. Acts at 1293 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-
333(B)). 
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to do so, interdiction otherwise remained in effect “until further 
ordered.”32  In other words, unless or until a court acting on its 
own initiative deemed it proper to lift an interdiction order, 
“habitual drunkard” became “a lifelong label.”33 
The interdiction scheme, as amended in 2020, no longer 
applies to “habitual drunkards.”34  However, the statute in its 
current form still permits the interdiction of any individual who 
“has been convicted of driving . . . while intoxicated.”35  The 2020 
amendments provided nothing new in the way of process; an 
order of interdiction still stands until the issuing court lifts it.36  
The “portion of the [interdiction] scheme addressing driving 
while intoxicated” was not at issue in Manning II.37 
Once interdicted, an individual “is subject to incarceration 
for the mere possession of or attempt to possess alcohol, or for 
being drunk in public.”38  Specifically, section 4.1-305 of the Code 
of Virginia makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor for an interdicted 
individual to “consume, purchase or possess, or attempt to con-
sume, purchase or possess, any alcoholic beverage.”39  Section 4.1-
322 additionally “establishes a Class 1 misdemeanor for an 
interdicted person to ‘possess any alcoholic beverages,’ or to be 
‘drunk in public.’ ”40  In Virginia, the maximum penalty for a 
Class 1 misdemeanor is “confinement in jail” for one year, a $500 
to $2,500 fine, or both.41  For an individual who has not been 
interdicted, public intoxication is a Class 4 misdemeanor, which 
is subject to a maximum fine of $250.42 
 
32 Id. (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A)). 
33 Slater, supra note 21, at 584. 
34 See sources cited supra note 6. 
35 VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-333(A) (2016 & Supp. 2020).  
36 Id. (“[T]he court may enter an order of interdiction prohibiting the sale of 
alcoholic beverages to [the interdicted individual] until further ordered.” (emphasis 
added)). 
37 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269 n.1, 284 & n.21.  
38 Id. at 269. 
39 VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-305(A), (C) (2016). 
40 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-322). 
41 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(a) (2014) (providing a maximum fine); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 4.1-305(C) (providing “a mandatory minimum fine”). 
42 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (providing that “any person” who appears “in 
public” under the influence of “alcohol” or any “other intoxicant or drug of whatever 
nature” is “guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor”); id. § 18.2-11(d) (providing that the 
“authorized punishment[ ] for conviction of a [Class 4] misdemeanor” is “a fine of not 
more than $250”); see also Manning II, 930 F.3d at 269. 
592 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:587   
Between 2007 and 2018, “[s]lightly more than 1,700 people 
were interdicted . . . in Virginia.”43  During that period, two-thirds 
of all interdiction proceedings—1,151 in all—occurred in Virginia 
Beach, a city that accounted for six percent of the state’s popula-
tion.44  Additionally, although only a little more than one percent 
of Virginians live in Roanoke,45 that city pursued 160 interdic-
tions—more than nine percent of the total.46  By contrast, some 
cities interdicted very few individuals.  Between 2010 and 2015, 
for example, Petersburg and Richmond interdicted only one and 
nine persons, respectively.47  Some cities and counties reported 
zero interdictions.48 
About a quarter of those who were interdicted as “habitual 
drunkards” were absent from their own interdiction hearings.49  
In such cases, the “ ‘habitual drunkard’ label” became “indelible” 
and subjected “people on the interdicted list” to years, or even dec-
ades, of suspicion, arrest, and incarceration.50  Bryan Manning’s 
interactions with the criminal justice system were not atypical.  
Interdicted individuals were arrested while shopping at a 7-Eleven 
where alcohol was sold,51 after “ ‘sleeping in a park bathroom’ 
where ‘a beer can was found in the trash,’ ” and even “for being 
‘near’ beer cans.”52 
 
43 Jane Harper, Virginia Law Allows People To Legally Be Declared a Drunk. Two-




45 Population Statistics of Roanoke City, Virginia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// 
www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/roanokecityvirginia,VA/PST045218 [https://perma 
.cc/5Q2Q-3KD7] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). 
46 Harper, supra note 43. 
47 Interdiction Fact Sheet, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR. 2, https://www.justice4all.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/LAJC_Interdiction_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW5J-
ZF9L] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). 
48 Harper, supra note 43. 
49 Id. 
50 M.L. Nestel, Virginia Jails People for Even Smelling Like Alcohol, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://thedailybeast.com/virginia-jails-people-for-
even-smelling-like-alcohol [https://perma.cc/VMR5-WPLL]. 
51 Id. 
52 Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 157 (4th Cir. 2018) (Motz, J., 
concurring), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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B. Procedural History 
1. The Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
In March 2016, Bryan Manning and four other homeless 
alcoholics filed a putative class action in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the 
Commonwealth’s Attorneys for Roanoke and Richmond.53  The 
plaintiffs in Hendrick v. Caldwell sought declarative and injunc-
tive relief “on their own behalf and on behalf of all individuals 
who ha[d] been, or [we]re at risk of being, ‘interdicted’ while 
being homeless and suffering from alcohol use disorder.”54  The 
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that application of Vir-
ginia’s interdiction scheme constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and 
Virginia;55 that interdiction was “a quasi-criminal proceeding” 
routinely conducted without “adequate due process protections” 
guaranteed under the state and federal constitutions;56 and that 
the statutory scheme was unconstitutionally vague.57 
The five named plaintiffs were interdicted between August 
2009 and January 2016.58  In each case, the court specified that 
its interdiction order would remain in effect until the court 
“alter[ed], amend[ed], or cancel[ed]” it.59  One plaintiff, Cary 
Hendrick, was present at his interdiction hearing.60  Hendrick 
“requested court-appointed counsel,” but the “court denied his 
request.”61  The four remaining plaintiffs were interdicted in ab-
sentia and without the assistance of counsel.62 
Interdiction subjected at least four of the five plaintiffs to 
frequent, repeated arrest.  At the time of the complaint, for ex-
ample, Richard Deckerhoff had been arrested “at least eleven 
 
53 See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. ¶¶ 118, 127, 135; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
56 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 141, 150; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”); VA. CONST. art I, § 11. 
57 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 155–58, 163. 
58 Id. ¶¶ 40, 49, 63, 75, 89. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 41, 50, 64, 76, 90. 
60 Id. ¶ 40. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. ¶¶ 49, 63, 75, 89. 
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times.”63  In one of those arrests, police officers “determined [that] 
a beer can on the ground near Mr. Deckerhoff was in his con-
structive possession.”64 
The Complaint asserted, as a statement of fact, that the five 
plaintiffs “suffer[ed] from alcohol use disorder, commonly referred 
to as alcoholism.”65  Alcohol dependence is typically characterized 
by, among other things, an inability to control the “onset, termi-
nation or level of use” of alcohol, “physiological withdrawal” 
symptoms “when alcohol use is reduced or ceased,” and persis-
tent use “despite clear signs of harmful consequences.”66  All five 
plaintiffs likely suffered from alcohol dependence syndrome.  
Three of the five plaintiffs received at least “limited” treatment 
for their addiction, but all struggled to maintain sobriety.67  At 
least two of the plaintiffs, Cary Hendrick and Ryan Williams, 
suffered from severe physical withdrawal symptoms: Hendrick 
had seizures when denied access to alcohol,68 and Williams suf-
fered from “shaking, dry-heaves, and increased blood pressure.”69  
All of the plaintiffs faced “harmful consequences” as a result of 
their drinking—including interdiction, repeated arrest, and in-
carceration—but all nevertheless persisted in drinking alcohol.70 
2. The Proceedings in District Court (Hendrick) 
In April 2016, the defendants, the Commonwealth’s Attorneys 
for Roanoke and Richmond, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
complaint.71  In addition to various procedural challenges, the de-
fendants argued that the “plaintiffs ha[d] failed to state a claim 
upon which relief [could] be granted.”72  The district court con-
 
63 Id. ¶ 77. 
64 Id. ¶ 78. 
65 Id. ¶ 23. 
66 THOMAS BABOR ET AL., ALCOHOL: NO ORDINARY COMMODITY 19 & box 2.2 
(2nd ed. 2010). 
67 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 46, 59, 72, 97. 
68 Id. ¶ 47. 
69 Id. ¶ 73. 
70 Id. ¶¶ 124–26. 
71 See Motion to Dismiss at 1, Hendrick v. Caldwell, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 (W.D. Va. 
2017), aff’d sub nom. Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en banc, 
930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 16-CV-0095); Memorandum in Support of Defen-
dants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d 868 (No. 16-CV-0095). 
72 Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 877. 
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sidered, and subsequently dismissed, each of the constitutional 
claims of the four plaintiffs.73 
First, the district court considered whether the interdiction 
statute “violate[d] the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment.”74  The plaintiffs relied on the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in Driver v. Hinnant75 that “the State cannot 
stamp an unpretending chronic alcoholic as a criminal if his 
drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease.”76  
Additionally, the plaintiffs cited two Ninth Circuit cases, 
Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch77 and Jones v. City of Los Angeles,78 for 
the proposition that a statute cannot “criminalize[ ] the status of 
being an alcoholic.”79  The district court rejected Ledezma-Cosino 
as “inapposite,” in part because the Ninth Circuit had “expressly” 
declined to consider “when or how persons with chronic alcohol-
ism may be punished for criminal acts committed while in an 
alcoholic state.”80  The district court also rejected the holding in 
Jones and instead dismissed the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment 
claim81 based on a line of cases extending from Robinson v. 
California82 through Powell v. Texas83 to Fisher v. Coleman.84 
In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck down a California 
law that criminalized the “ ‘status’ of narcotic addiction.”85  After 
police officers “had occasion to examine the appellant’s arms” and 
“observed discolorations and scabs” that appeared to be needle 
tracks, the appellant was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted 
under a state statute that made it a misdemeanor for a person to 
“be addicted to the use of narcotics.”86  The Supreme Court recog-
nized the “broad power of a State to regulate the narcotic drugs 
 
73 See id. at 883, 891–92, 895. In August 2016, the parties moved jointly to 
dismiss the state-law claims, and the court did so. See id. at 876 n.2. The court, 
having received a Suggestion of Death with respect to named plaintiff Cary 
Hendrick, did not consider any of his claims. See id. at 875 n.1. 
74 Id. at 884. 
75 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). 
76 Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (quoting Driver, 356 F.2d at 765). 
77 819 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.), vacated, 839 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2016). 
78 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). 
79 Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
80 Id. at 885 (quoting Ledezma-Cosino, 819 F.3d at 1078 n.1). 
81 Id. at 885–86. 
82 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
83 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
84 486 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981), 
overruled by Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II) 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). 
85 Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 885 (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666). 
86 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661–62. 
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traffic within its borders,” but nevertheless concluded that 
“narcotic addiction is an illness . . . which may be contracted 
innocently or involuntarily.”87  The Court further held that  
a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a crim-
inal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug 
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, 
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . .  Even one day in prison would be a 
cruel and unusual punishment for the “crime” of having a 
common cold.88 
Six years later, in Powell, a plurality of the Court held that 
“Robinson did not reach the question of whether the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits punishment of conduct symptomatic of a 
disease” and that “the doctrines of criminal responsibility are 
traditionally the province of the states.”89  Guided by these “im-
portant principles,”90 the District Court for the Western District 
of Virginia concluded in Fisher that the Eighth Amendment does 
not forbid a state from criminalizing “conduct symptomatic of 
alcoholism.”91  In fact, the Fisher court found that Powell “specifi-
cally rejected” that proposition.92 
In Hendrick, the district court held that the interdiction 
statute, like the statute at issue in Powell, “impose[d] ‘a criminal 
sanction for public behavior which may create substantial health 
and safety hazards . . . and which offends the moral and esthetic 
sensibilities of a large segment of the community.’ ”93  Even as it 
acknowledged that criminal law has evolved over time and con-
tinues to evolve in response to “changing religious, moral, philo-
sophical, and medical views of the nature of man,”94 the court 
deferred to the legislature’s prerogative to shape “the outer 
contours of what can be punished.”95 
Ultimately, the district court held in Hendrick that, because 
Virginia’s interdiction scheme targets the possession and con-
sumption of alcohol, it punishes specific acts rather than a 
 
87 Id. at 664, 667. 
88 Id. at 667. 
89 Hendrick, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 885. 
90 Id. at 885. 
91 Id. at 886 (quoting Fisher v. Coleman, 486 F. Supp. 311, 316 (W.D. Va. 1979), 
aff’d, 639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981), overruled by Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II) 
930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019)). 
92 Id. at 886 (quoting Fisher, 486 F. Supp. at 316). 
93 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968)). 
94 Id. at 887 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 535–36). 
95 Id. at 887–88. 
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status.96  And because Fisher constrained the court from consider-
ing whether the “disease” of alcohol addiction compelled the 
plaintiffs to commit the prohibited acts, the court was bound to 
conclude that the interdiction scheme did not offend the Eighth 
Amendment.97 
Second, the district court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs’ 
Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claim.  Because the plaintiffs 
had identified themselves in their pleadings as “homeless alco-
holics,” and had admitted that they were “compelled to possess 
and consume alcohol,” the court “readily” concluded that “the 
statutory term ‘habitual drunkard’ ” applied to them.98  And be-
cause an individual “may not successfully challenge [a statute] 
for vagueness” if it is “clearly” applicable to that individual’s 
conduct, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge the interdiction scheme on that ground.99  The court 
did not, in any case, find that the statute lacked clarity.  Relying 
in part on Fisher, the court held that the meaning of “habitual 
drunkard” is commonly understood and therefore “sufficiently 
precise.”100  The court also concluded that the interdiction scheme 
provided “explicit standards which law enforcement may apply to 
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”101 
Finally, with respect to the plaintiffs’ due process claim, the 
district court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to ap-
pointed counsel at their interdiction proceedings, which are civil 
matters.102  And because government-appointed counsel repre-
sented the plaintiffs at their criminal proceedings, the court held 
that the plaintiffs could not state a valid claim under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.103 
 
96 Id. at 888. 
97 See id. at 886–88. 
98 Id. at 892. 
99 Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)). 
100 Id. (citing Fisher v. Coleman, 468 F. Supp. 311, 315 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff’d, 
639 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1981), overruled by Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II) 930 
F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he common meaning of the term[ ] habitual drunkard 
clearly encompasses one who . . . is admittedly in the continual habit of being 
intoxicated from alcohol.”)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 889–90. 
103 Id. at 891. 
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3. The Appeal to the Fourth Circuit (Manning I) 
The four surviving plaintiffs104 appealed, and a panel of the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.105  Writing 
for the panel, Judge Wilkinson devoted just a few paragraphs to 
the plaintiffs’ claim that, “despite their nominally civil character, 
interdiction proceedings must afford criminal protections” under 
the Due Process Clause.106  Finding that interdiction deprives an 
individual of nothing more than “the legal right to purchase, 
possess, or consume alcohol,” the panel determined that an indi-
vidual’s liberty is not at stake in an interdiction proceeding.107  
The panel further held that, under Paul v. Davis, a potential 
“reputational injur[y]” like the one at stake in an interdiction 
proceeding is not a constitutionally protected interest, and for 
that reason the plaintiffs could not prevail in their due process 
claims.108 
The panel’s opinion devoted significantly more space to de-
termining whether the interdiction scheme punished a status in 
violation of Robinson and the Eighth Amendment.  Noting that a 
fragmented Court decided Powell in a 4–1–4 decision, the panel 
concluded that Powell’s plurality opinion could not be read as 
overturning the status-act distinction in Robinson.109  With no 
“clear signal from the Supreme Court that Robinson no longer 
remains good law,” the panel declined “to overturn or greatly 
extend” it to criminalize nonvolitional conduct compelled by 
addiction.110  Having concluded that neither Robinson nor Powell 
prohibits the criminalization of “compelled behavior,” the panel 
held that the interdiction scheme constituted a permissible exer-
cise of Virginia’s police power.111  In the court’s view, the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause could not be applicable to 
interdiction itself, because interdiction is a civil, rather than a 
criminal, proceeding.112  And because the criminal sanctions that 
apply to interdicted individuals target specific, well-defined acts, 
 
104 See supra note 73. 
105 Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 154 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d en 
banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). 
106 Id. at 151. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 151–52 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). 
109 Id. at 146 (“To the extent that post-Powell decisions have relied upon the 
plurality opinion in Powell, they have overextended themselves in doing so.”). 
110 Id. at 146–47. 
111 Id. at 147–48. 
112 Id. at 148. 
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the panel found that those criminal sanctions also pass constitu-
tional muster under the Eighth Amendment.113  Although Virgin-
ia’s interdiction scheme was unique in its precise contours, the 
panel found it to be no different in kind from other civil-criminal 
statutory schemes that “adopt a two-step approach” and “sanction 
relatively minor acts in order to forestall more serious criminal 
misconduct.”114  For example, courts routinely grant temporary 
restraining orders in civil proceedings, and anyone who violates 
such an order may be subject to criminal penalties.115 
Judge Motz wrote separately to argue that Powell could—
and should—be read as repudiating the status-act distinction in 
Robinson.116  She argued that the outcome in Robinson would have 
been the same had the statute at issue in that case permitted the 
state first to interdict the appellant and deem him a “prescription 
drug addict[ ]” and then to subject him to criminal penalties for 
attempting to fill a legally obtained prescription for narcotics.117  
Because Virginia’s statutory scheme would be unconstitutional 
under Robinson if it criminalized alcoholism “in one step,” and 
the outcome in Robinson would have been the same had Cali-
fornia criminalized narcotics addiction in two steps, Judge Motz 
concluded that the interdiction scheme must be impermissible 
under Robinson.118  Nevertheless, because Fisher “constitute[d] 
circuit precedent” and compelled the panel’s judgment, Judge 
Motz concurred “with reluctance and regret.”119 
4. Rehearing En Banc (Manning II) 
After rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit reversed itself, 
held that Virginia’s interdiction statute was void for vagueness, 
and overturned Fisher.120  Judge Motz and Judge Keenan, writing 
for a majority of eight, based their opinion in large part on Judge 
Motz’s concurrence in Manning I.  Judge Wilkinson wrote a dis-
sent, in which five judges joined. 
Although the plaintiffs argued before the district court that 
the term “habitual drunkard” is unconstitutionally vague, they 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 149. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 156 (Motz, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 157. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 160 & n.4. 
120 Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 264, 285 (4th Cir. 2019) (en 
banc). 
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“expressly declined” to argue the issue on appeal, either before 
the panel or the en banc court.121  The majority in Manning II 
nevertheless concluded that it had discretion to consider, sua 
sponte, arguments not raised by the parties122 and “excus[ed]” the 
plaintiffs’ “abandonment or forfeiture” of their vagueness claim.123  
In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson characterized the plaintiffs’ “fail-
ure to press a claim” as a waiver rather than a forfeiture and 
argued that the court had “no basis for reaching the vagueness 
challenge.”124 
As to the merits of the vagueness claim, the majority found 
that Virginia’s statutory scheme failed to establish “any standard 
of conduct by which persons [could] determine whether they [we]re 
violating the statute” or even “minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement” in enforcing the statute.125  The court held the stat-
utory scheme to be “unconstitutionally vague” even as applied to 
the plaintiffs, who “admitted difficulty in maintaining sobriety.”126 
The dissent found the vagueness claim unavailing.127  Judge 
Wilkinson argued that the “sole purpose” of the interdiction proc-
ess itself is to “provide notice” and “address the very concerns 
that motivate vagueness doctrine in the first place.”128  Even if 
that were not so, the dissent argued, “the term ‘habitual drunk-
ard’ . . . is simply not vague under any conceivable standard.”129 
With respect to the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, the 
majority cited Powell for the proposition that, for homeless al-
coholics who could neither resist drinking nor avoid public places, 
a public intoxication statute “would be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to them.”130  Because the plaintiffs were “pathologically” driv-
en to “pursue alcohol use,” had no “volitional control over their 
drinking,” and could not avoid drinking in public, the majority 
concluded that Virginia’s statutory scheme was unconstitutional 
 
121 Id. at 271. 
122 Id. (collecting cases). 
123 Id. at 271–72, 271 n.6. 
124 Id. at 300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“We do not have here a simple failure to 
press a claim. The appellants instead expressly waived any appeal on their vague-
ness challenge.”). 
125 Id. at 274 (majority opinion). 
126 Id. at 277–78. 
127 Id. at 301 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 280–81 (majority opinion) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 
(1968)). 
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as applied to the plaintiffs.131  The scheme “would, in effect, ‘ban[ ] 
a single act for which [homeless alcoholics] may not be convicted 
under the Eighth Amendment—the act of getting drunk.’ ”132 
Just as the majority found support in Powell for its opinion, 
so too did Judge Wilkinson in his dissent.  He argued that “Powell 
neither extended [n]or contracted Robinson, which was left undis-
turbed.”133  After a review of post-Powell cases, the dissent con-
cluded that the majority opinion was “at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of its own decision.”134  According to the 
dissent, the majority’s opinion introduced a “nebulous ‘nonvoli-
tional conduct’ defense,” which could “metastasize and absolve 
individuals from personal responsibility for all forms and man-
ners of criminal acts.”135 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. The En Banc Court’s Void-for-Vagueness Rationale Is 
Inapposite 
1. The Court Should Not Have Considered the Plaintiffs’ 
Waived Claims 
Waiver and forfeiture are distinct under the law.  “Whereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, 
waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right.’ ”136  In Manning II, the en banc court cited United 
States v. Simms for the proposition that “waiver, in a technical 
sense, concerns a party’s relinquishment of rights before a dis-
trict court.”137  Simms in turn cited to United States v. Olano for 
the proposition that, “where a party raises and then knowingly 
withdraws a claim before the district court, there is no error for 
[an appellate court] to review.”138  In other words, if the plaintiffs 
had raised and dropped their vagueness claim in Hendrick, the 
 
131 Id. at 281 (quoting Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 25). 
132 Id. at 280–81 (alterations in original) (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 551). 
133 Id. at 289 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 304. 
136 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
137 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 271 n.6 (quoting United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 
229, 238 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 304 (2019) (mem.)). 
138 Simms, 914 F.3d at 238 n.4 (emphasis added) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 733). 
602 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:587   
en banc court would have been compelled to deem it waived and 
could not have considered it in Manning II. 
Although that may be true, circuit courts also routinely 
reject claims that parties have litigated at trial but have 
neglected, omitted, or declined to raise at the outset of an ap-
peal.139  For example, in United States v. Washington, a panel of 
the Fourth Circuit held that an appellant had waived the claims 
and defenses he had “failed to raise in his opening [appellate] 
brief.”140  In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson posited that, prior to 
this case, the Fourth Circuit had been “especially reluctant to 
consider waived arguments”141   
Judge Wilkinson argued further that the “open-endedness” of 
the majority’s opinion may threaten “the neutrality of procedure” 
that “protects litigants . . . against arbitrary courts and ambush 
by adversaries.”142  Having “provided no standard under which an 
en banc court can resolve a claim affirmatively waived before a 
panel,” the majority’s decision to do so in this case may “signif-
icantly degrade[ ] the place of panel process in federal appellate 
review.”143  More to the point, under the majority’s rule, no waiver 
is ever final: “Future litigants will rely on this case endlessly to 
excuse inexcusable carelessness, or worse, calculated litigation 
strategy that in hindsight proved unsuccessful.”144 
Judge Wilkinson’s arguments are not unpersuasive.  The en 
banc court placed a particular emphasis on the “exceptional im-
portance” of the vagueness issue and expressed a willingness to 
 
139 See, e.g., McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We think it 
reasonable to hold appellate counsel to a standard that obliges a lawyer to include 
his most cogent arguments in his opening brief, upon pain of otherwise finding them 
waived.”); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well 
settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”), aff’d, 487 Fed App’x 1 (3d Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases) 
(“We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and 
arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where 
those arguments raise constitutional issues).”), aff’d, 972 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(unpublished table decision). 
140 United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 941 n.1 (4th Cir. 2014) (collecting 
cases) (“[W]e do not countenance a litigant’s use of [Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure] 28(j) as a means to advance new arguments couched as supplemental 
authorities.” (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ashford, 718 
F.3d 377, 381 (4th Cir. 2013))). 
141 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 301. 
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consider “alternative legal theor[ies]” that it “deemed necessary 
to reach the correct result.”145  Reaching back to a Fourth Circuit 
case decided in 1971 and a Supreme Court case decided thirty 
years earlier, the majority asserted that the Courts of Appeal 
may “sua sponte consider points not presented to the district 
court and not even raised on appeal by any party.”146   
It appears that the en banc court was willing to resurrect the 
plaintiffs’ vagueness claim under nearly any circumstances.  
That it chose to do so in a way that undermines the efficiency 
and comity of the appellate process147 is all the more unfortunate, 
given that the en banc court’s holding is likely incorrect on the 
merits. 
2. The Term “Habitual Drunkard” Is Not Unconstitutionally 
Vague 
Vagueness doctrine exists to provide “fair notice” so that 
“citizens [can] conform their conduct to the proscriptions of the 
law.”148  Some imprecision is tolerable, but the more severe the 
consequences of violating a statute, the more precise its terms 
are expected to be.149  Given that “civil laws” may “impose penal-
ties far more severe” than their criminal counterparts, vagueness 
doctrine is not applicable solely to criminal statutes.150  Courts 
have applied “ ‘relatively strict test[s]’ for vagueness” to civil laws 
with “quasi-criminal” and “stigmatizing effect[s].”151 
Nevertheless, even in cases where the Supreme Court has 
applied “the most exacting vagueness standard”152 and “the most 
rigorous scrutiny,” it has found that “open-ended” and “impre-
cise” terms are “perfectly constitutional.”153  In Jordan v. De 
 
145 Id. at 271–72 (majority opinion) (first quoting United States v. Simms, 914 
F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019); and then quoting Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Va. Elec. & 
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1971)). 
146 Id. at 271 (quoting Wash. Gas Light Co., 438 F.2d at 251) (citing Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). 
147 Id. at 300 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“[A] panel of three remains our basic 
unit of decision, three being a more efficient and more collaborative number than a 
conclave of fifteen.”). 
148 Id. at 274 (majority opinion). 
149 Id. at 272–73. 
150 Id. at 272 (quoting Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gor-
such, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
151 Id. at 273 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 
U.S. 489, 499 (1982)). 
152 Id. (quoting Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213). 
153 Id. at 301–02 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1214). 
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George, for example, the Supreme Court upheld the respondent’s 
deportation order, although it was predicated on his conviction 
for a “crime involving moral turpitude.”154  The Court held that 
whatever shades of meaning the phrase might acquire “in 
peripheral cases,” its meaning was sufficiently clear in the 
respondent’s case.155  Similarly, just a few months before a panel 
of the Fourth Circuit decided Manning I, the Supreme Court 
noted in Sessions v. Dimaya that “[m]any perfectly constitutional 
statutes use imprecise terms like ‘serious potential risk’ . . . or 
‘substantial risk.’ ”156  The Dimaya Court ultimately held the 
statute in question to be vague—but not because the Court had 
any reason to “doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the 
application of a qualitative standard . . . to real-world conduct.”157  
Rather, the issue was that the statute, by its terms, required the 
Court to estimate the risk of an “idealized ordinary case of [a] 
crime,” not any particular criminal act that the respondent had 
committed.158 
Here, there is no such issue.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in 
Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, “the term ‘habitual drunkard’ read-
ily lends itself to an objective factual inquiry.”159  Moreover, while 
it is no doubt true that “habitual drunkard” is an archaic and 
even a stigmatizing term, it is also true that many laws retain 
the use of such terms without offending the Constitution.  As 
noted above, for example, the Supreme Court in Jordan found 
that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” was not un-
constitutionally vague.160 
As Judge Wilkinson noted in his dissent, Virginia courts 
have had no difficulty supplying definitions for the term “ha-
bitual drunkard.”161  In Jackson v. Commonwealth, for example, 
the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the term applies to “one 
who . . . is admittedly in the continual habit of being intoxicated 
 
154 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1951). 
155 Id. at 232 (“[T]he decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was 
an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.”). 
156 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1214. 
157 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015)) (“[T]he 
law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . 
some matter of degree.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nash v. United 
States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913))). 
158 Id. at 1213–14 (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561). 
159 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017). 
160 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951). 
161 Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 264, 302 (4th Cir. 2019) (en 
banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
2020] MANNING AND HABITUAL MISUNDERSTANDING 605 
from alcohol.”162  Other courts have described with even more spe-
cificity the patterns of conduct that characterize a “habitual 
drunkard”: “a repeated course of consuming alcohol to excess, 
excess being the impairment of judgment, the loss of motor 
function, the lessening of impulse control, and other commonly 
recognized effects.”163   
As the plaintiffs’ own pleadings show, they exhibited many of 
these effects and frequently consumed alcohol to excess.  Although 
the term “habitual drunkard” may create some uncertainty as 
applied in borderline cases, it clearly applied to the plaintiffs, 
who admitted in their own pleadings that their alcoholism 
rendered them “unable to maintain sobriety.”164  The Fourth Cir-
cuit should have found, as the district court found in Hendrick,165 
that because the statute clearly applied to the plaintiffs, they 
lacked standing to challenge the interdiction scheme on vague-
ness grounds. 
B. The En Banc Court Overextended Itself in Relying on Powell 
1. Both the Majority and Dissent Relied on Powell 
The correct interpretation of Powell hinges at least in part on 
a separate pair of cases, Marks v. United States166 and Hughes v. 
United States.167  In Marks, the Supreme Court held that, where 
a case is decided by a plurality, “the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred 
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”168  Judge Wilkinson 
and Judge Motz read Hughes very differently.  The Court in 
Hughes found either “that it was ‘unnecessary to consider’ its 
holding in Marks,”169 as Judge Wilkinson would have it, or that it 
was “ ‘unnecessary’ to reconsider the reasoning of the Marks 
rule,”170 as Judge Motz put it. 
 
162 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 122, 125 (Va. Ct. App. 2004). 
163 Manning II, 930 F.3d at 302 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
164 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 120–21. 
165 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
166 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
167 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). 
168 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
(1976) (plurality opinion)). 
169 Manning v. Caldwell (Manning I), 900 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 2018) (empha-
sis added), rev’d en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). 
170 Id. at 156 (Motz, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
606 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:587   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hughes on three 
questions, two of which concerned the proper application of 
Marks to the Court’s fragmented decision in Freeman v. United 
States.171  The Court received “extensive briefing” and heard 
“careful argument” on two questions related to Marks: 
(1) “Whether [the Supreme] Court’s decision in Marks means 
that the concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the 
holding of the Court where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor 
the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other”; and 
(2) “Whether, under Marks, the lower courts are bound by [a] 
four-Justice plurality opinion . . . , or, instead, by [a] separate 
concurring opinion with which all eight other Justices 
disagreed.”172 
Both of these questions went unanswered.  The makeup of the 
Court had changed between 2011, when a fractured Court 
decided Freeman, and 2018, when the Court heard arguments in 
Hughes.173  Lower courts had also had occasion to apply and 
interpret the Court’s decision in Freeman, and in the process had 
uncovered “systemic concerns” with its rationale.174  After careful 
reconsideration of the underlying question presented in Freeman, 
the Court in Hughes was able to resolve it on the merits with a 
majority of six justices.175 
Under these circumstances, it is not precisely correct to say 
that the Court in Hughes found it either “unnecessary to con-
sider” or “unnecessary to reconsider” Marks.  Rather, as Justice 
Kennedy wrote in his opinion for the majority in Hughes, the 
Court found it “unnecessary to consider questions one and two”—
the questions pertaining to Marks.176  Even so, Hughes is not en-
tirely a red herring.  It may serve as a preview of things to come 
if the Supreme Court has occasion to reconsider its decision in 
Powell. 
To be sure, Powell is ripe for reconsideration.  The appellant 
in that case, Leroy Powell, challenged his conviction for public 
 
171 See Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1771–72; Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 
(2011). 
172 Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155)). 
173 In Freeman, Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent. Freeman, 
564 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In Hughes, Justice Gorsuch joined the 
majority. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1770 (majority opinion). 
174 Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. (emphasis added). 
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intoxication on the ground that his “chronic alcoholism” com-
pelled him to drink and “his appearance in public [while drunk 
was] . . . not of his own volition.”177  Although Justice Marshall, in 
his opinion for the plurality, relied on the best science available 
at the time, he found no evidence that Leroy Powell’s alcohol 
addiction had compelled his behavior, or even that Powell “could 
in fact properly be diagnosed as [an] alcoholic” at all.178 
At trial, Powell testified that he had had a single drink 
before coming to court.179  On cross-examination, the prosecution 
elicited testimony that Powell had “exercised [his] will power and 
kept from drinking anything . . . except that one drink.”180  Powell 
testified on redirect, however, that once he began drinking he 
ordinarily had no “control over how many drinks [he could] 
take.”181  The record does not disclose whether Powell routinely 
suffered from withdrawal symptoms, or if he drank on the 
morning of trial because he hoped to forestall such symptoms.182 
Because Powell had been able, at least on the day of his trial, 
to stop after a single drink, and because he had reported no with-
drawal symptoms, Justice Marshall refused to conclude that 
Powell suffered a “compulsion” to drink.183  To Justice Marshall 
and the plurality, it seems to have been quite clear that Powell 
drank of his own “free will,” and his conviction for public 
intoxication was justified.184  In fact, the plurality leaned into the 
notion that criminal sanctions may serve as a “powerful deter-
rent” against public drunkenness: “Criminal conviction repre-
sents the degrading public revelation of what Anglo-American 
society has long condemned as a moral defect, and the existence 
of criminal sanctions may serve to reinforce this cultural taboo.”185 
Justice White, concurring in the plurality’s judgment, wrote 
that, “[i]f it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion 
to use narcotics,” then it could not “constitutionally be a crime to 
yield to such a compulsion.”186  Nevertheless, he recognized that 
 
177 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (alterations in original). 
178 Id. at 524. 
179 Id. at 519–20. 
180 Id. at 519. 
181 Id. at 520. 
182 See id. at 525. 
183 Id. at 535. 
184 Id. at 526, 535. 
185 Id. at 530–31. 
186 Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). 
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Powell had been convicted of “being drunk in a public place.”187  
For a homeless alcoholic who lived on the public streets and had 
“no place else to go and no place else to be [while] drinking,” 
Justice White accepted that “a showing could be made that . . . 
avoiding public places when intoxicated” would be “impossible.”188  
“As applied” to such individuals, a public intoxication statute 
would be “in effect a law which bans a single act for which they 
may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendment—the act of 
getting drunk.”189  Because the record did not show that Powell 
lacked the capacity “to stay off the streets” while drinking, 
however, Justice White concluded that Powell’s conviction did not 
offend the Constitution.190 
The dissenters in Powell saw addiction generally, and alco-
holism specifically, as a disease, rather than as a moral failing.  
They argued that Powell’s alcoholism rendered him unable to 
“resist the ‘constant excessive consumption of alcohol.’ ”191  Be-
cause “he could not prevent himself from appearing in public 
places” when he drank,192 the dissenters would have held that his 
public intoxication was “symptomatic of [his] disease.”193  Under 
these circumstances, the dissenters would have followed the 
Court’s decision in Robinson and concluded that subjecting 
Powell to criminal penalties for public intoxication constituted 
“ ‘cruel and inhuman punishment’ within the prohibition of the 
Eighth Amendment.”194  “[T]he principle that would deny power to 
exact capital punishment for a petty crime would also deny 
power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being 
sick.”195 
2. Now More Than Ever, It Is Unclear Whether Powell Is Still 
Good Law 
As the Supreme Court itself has recognized, the Marks rule 
is relatively simple to explain, but difficult to apply in practice.196  
 
187 Id. at 553 (emphasis added). 
188 Id. at 551. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 553–54. 
191 Id. at 570 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
192 Id. at 568. 
193 Id. at 569. 
194 Id. at 569–70. 
195 Id. at 569 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, 
J., concurring)). 
196 See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994) (noting that the 
rule “is more easily stated than applied”). 
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Manning II is a quintessential example of the rule’s difficulty of 
application.  Judge Motz, writing for the majority, concluded that 
Justice White’s concurrence constituted “the narrowest ground 
supporting the Court’s judgment” in Powell.197  In his dissent, 
Judge Wilkinson argued instead that neither the plurality in 
Powell, nor Justice White’s concurrence, nor any other holding 
has “overturn[ed] or in any way disrupt[ed] Robinson.”198 
In similar cases, the Court has declined “to pursue the 
Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so 
obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have con-
sidered it.”199  Instead, the Court has reexamined its fragmented 
decisions and, where possible, has issued clear precedents.  In 
Nichols v. United States, for example, the Court reconsidered its 
“splintered decision” in Baldasar v. Illinois200 rather than at-
tempting to apply the Marks rule.201  Although the Court had 
occasion in Grutter v. Bollinger to revisit its “fractured decision” 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,202 it again 
found it unnecessary to apply Marks.203  Rather than rummaging 
through the six opinions produced in Bakke and declaring under 
Marks that the narrowest of them was binding, the Court instead 
“endorse[d]” the reasoning of Justice Powell’s concurrence and 
built upon it to forge a workable set of standards that com-
manded a five-justice majority.204  And as discussed above, the 
Court in Hughes reconsidered the underlying issue in Freeman 
rather than applying the Marks rule.205 
Half a century ago, when Justice Marshall was writing for 
the plurality in Powell, there were “tremendous gaps” in the 
scientific understanding of addiction.206  At that time, E.M. 
Jellinek was among “the outstanding authorities on the subject” 
of alcoholism.207  Jellinek was in fact a pioneer in the area of 
 
197 Manning v. Caldwell (Manning II), 930 F.3d 264, 280 & n.13 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(en banc). 
198 Id. at 290 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
199 Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46. 
200 446 U.S. 222 (1980). 
201 Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745–46. 
202 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
203 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, aff’d, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
204 Id. 
205 See supra notes 171–176 and accompanying text. 
206 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 524 (1968). 
207 Id. at 522. 
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addiction research and “helped orient the field at its inception.”208  
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall found himself baffled by 
Jellinek’s work: “In attempting to deal with the alcoholic’s desire 
for drink in the absence of withdrawal symptoms, Jellinek is 
reduced to unintelligible distinctions between a ‘compulsion’ . . . 
and an ‘impulse.’ ”209  It does not seem to have occurred to Justice 
Marshall that Leroy Powell drank wine at eight o’clock in the 
morning not because he sought some hedonistic thrill or because 
he was in thrall to some moral infirmity but rather because he 
had to drink to avoid withdrawal symptoms. 
It is unlikely that a modern court would be so unaware—or 
so heedless—of the workings of addiction.  Addiction is now com-
monly spoken of as a disease rather than as a moral failing.  The 
“disease model” of alcoholism “construes alcoholism as an incur-
able all-or-none unitary disorder caused solely by hereditary 
physical abnormalities.”210  “According to [this] model, addiction 
is a brain disease . . . characterized by changes in specific brain 
systems, especially those that process rewards . . . .”211  The Na-
tional Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has funded 
biomedical research into “the neurotransmitter systems on which 
alcohol acts.”212  Underlying this work is a “policy mantra . . . that 
alcoholism is a ‘chronic brain disease.’ ”213 
Although early addiction researchers, including Jellinek, 
proposed the disease model at least in part to remove the moral 
stigma of addiction,214 the stigma remains.  Even recovering alco-
holics, for whom the disease model is the very foundation of their 
treatment efforts, often speak of addiction in terms of “moral 
inventory,”215 “spiritual disease,”216 and “character defects.”217 
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A tone of moral disapprobation also suffuses both of Judge 
Wilkinson’s Manning opinions.  In Manning I, for example, he 
compared the compulsive drinking of an alcoholic to a child 
molester’s “uncontrollable pedophilic urges.”218  And in his dis-
sent in Manning II, he argued that, because “irresponsible 
alcohol consumption increases the likelihood of more grave 
offenses,” Virginia’s lawmakers “surely had good reason to think 
that the population of prior abusers posed a greater risk to the 
community than others who lack such a history.”219  True, Judge 
Wilkinson’s argument does not go quite so far as Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion in Powell in suggesting that criminal penalties 
and the concomitant moral stigma may “reinforce [a] cultural 
taboo” forbidding alcoholism, just as they “reinforce other, 
stronger feelings against murder, rape, theft, and other forms of 
antisocial conduct.”220  But at bottom, Judge Wilkinson’s argu-
ment is the same as Justice Marshall’s: criminal penalties are 
valid exercises of state police power because they may effect 
general and specific deterrence and discourage addicts from 
giving into their moral weaknesses and succumbing to their 
addictions. 
The Supreme Court justices who issued the fractured opin-
ions in Powell, no less than the Fourth Circuit judges who heard 
Manning I and II, approached their decisions with moral judg-
ments and “strong feelings” about alcoholism and addiction.  If 
the current Court were to reconsider Powell, the outcome would 
largely depend on whether at least five justices believe that, as 
Judge Wilkinson put it, “consuming alcohol, even by those with a 
documented history of alcohol abuse, is just not the sort of 
conduct that warrants criminal sanctions.”221  It is unlikely that a 
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majority of the modern Court would agree with that proposition.  
On the contrary, were the Court to take up, for example, a chal-
lenge to Utah’s interdiction scheme, a majority may well accept 
that alcoholism is a disease even as it upholds the interdiction 
scheme as constitutionally sound.  For that reason, the en banc 
court should not have “overextended” itself in basing its decision 
on Justice White’s concurrence in Powell. 
C. Constantineau Should Have Controlled the Outcome of 
Manning 
In Manning I, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims, noting that, in Paul 
v. Davis, “the Supreme Court ha[d] been careful” to establish 
that the “redress of reputational injuries” is the province of “state 
law.”222  In Manning II, the en banc court declined to pass on the 
plaintiffs’ due process claims.223  The majority may have been sat-
isfied that the Eighth Amendment and the Vagueness Doctrine 
provided all the relief that the plaintiffs required—or it may have 
agreed with the finding of the panel that Paul precludes the “re-
dress” of injuries to a litigant’s reputation. 
In Paul, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier decision in 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,224 in which it held that cases “[w]here 
a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him” could properly 
be heard in the federal courts.225  At issue in Constantineau was a 
Wisconsin statute that authorized “designated persons” to “cause[ ] 
to be posted a notice” prohibiting “the sale or gift” of alcoholic 
beverages to anyone whose “excessive drinking” threatened to 
reduce her family to penury or jeopardized “the peace of any 
community.”226  Although the Wisconsin statute required any 
such “posting” to be in writing, and further that a “copy of [the] 
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writing . . . be personally served upon the person” to whom it 
pertained, the statute did not provide for either notice or a 
hearing.227  The Court held that “posting” constituted “such a 
stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process 
require[d] notice and an opportunity to be heard.”228 
The Court in Paul held that, even where a state’s tort law 
protects an individual’s “interest in reputation,” governmental 
action that inflicts some “harm or injury to that interest,” with-
out more, is insufficient to support a claim that the government 
has deprived the individual of “liberty” or “property.”229  In so 
doing, however, the Court was careful to leave Constantineau in-
tact.  Constantineau rooted the right to relief under the Due 
Process Clause not solely in the “defamatory character of the 
posting” and the resulting “stigma” but also in “the governmental 
action” that “deprived the individual of a right previously held 
under state law—the right to purchase or obtain liquor in 
common with the rest of the citizenry.”230 
In essence, though not in nomenclature, the Wisconsin 
statute at issue in Constantineau provided for the interdiction of 
habitual drunkards.  Although Constantineau thus appears to be 
directly on point, it is all but absent from the pleadings and 
opinions generated in this case.231  Had the Fourth Circuit found-
ed its Manning II decision on Constantineau, it could have 
reached the same outcome and provided the same relief to the 
plaintiffs.  But in doing so it would have relied on a case that, 
unlike Powell, was decided by a six-justice majority and mani-
festly remains good law. 
CONCLUSION 
Virginia was nearly alone in maintaining a two-phase inter-
diction scheme that branded alcoholics “habitual drunkards” and 
subjected them to criminal penalties for the possession of alcohol.  
Such punitive solutions are manifestly cruel and generally 
ineffective.232  In March 2020, after the Virginia General Assem-
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bly approved a bill repealing the interdiction scheme as it applied 
to “habitual drunkards,” both the bill’s sponsor and the governor 
acknowledged how inapt the scheme had become.233  Delegate 
Jennifer Carroll Foy characterized the interdiction of “habitual 
drunkards” as “draconian” and “arbitrary.”234  Governor Ralph S. 
Northam noted that the Commonwealth’s “archaic” law “crimi-
nalize[d] people for being homeless or suffering from addiction” 
and “punished [them] without helping them.”235 
To the extent that Manning II declared the interdiction 
scheme unconstitutional and all but signed its death warrant, 
there can be little doubt that the Fourth Circuit reached a correct 
and sensible result.  But in its apparent eagerness to redress an 
injustice, the en banc court founded its opinion on Powell, a 
precedent that, for all its longevity, may be vulnerable to 
supersession or reversal.  Had the court decided the case based 
on the plaintiffs’ due process claims, its decision would stand on 
firmer ground, and it would not have deepened an existing split 
of authority among the circuit courts.236 
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